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Abstract
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are organized prolonged cyberattacks by sophisticated attackers with the intend of stealing
critical information. Although APT activities are stealthy and evade detection by traditional detection tools, they interact with the
system components to make progress in the attack. These interactions lead to information flows which are recorded in the form of
system log. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) has been proposed as one of the effective ways to detect APTs using the
information flows. A DIFT-based detection mechanism dynamically performs security analysis on the information flows to detect
possible attacks. However, wide range security analysis using DIFT results in significant increase in performance overhead and high
rates of false-positives and false-negatives generated by DIFT. In this paper, we model the strategic interaction between APT and
DIFT as a non-cooperative stochastic game. The game unfolds on a state space constructed from an information flow graph (IFG)
that is extracted from the system log. The objective of the APT in the game is to choose transitions in the IFG to find an optimal
path in the IFG from an entry point of the attack to an attack target. On the other hand, the objective of DIFT is to dynamically
select nodes in the IFG to perform security analysis for detecting APT. Our game model has imperfect information as the players
do not have information about the actions of the opponent. We consider two scenarios of the game (i) when the false-positive and
false-negative rates are known to both players and (ii) when the false-positive and false-negative rates are unknown to both players.
Case (i) translates to a game model with complete information and we propose a value iteration-based algorithm and prove the
convergence. Case (ii) translates to a game with unknown transition probabilities. In this case, we propose Hierarchical Supervised
Learning (HSL) algorithm that integrates a neural network, to predict the value vector of the game, with a policy iteration algorithm
to compute an approximate equilibrium. We implemented our algorithms for cases (i) and (ii) on real attack datasets for nation state
and ransomware attacks and validated the performance of our approach.
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1. Introduction
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are sophisticated and
prolonged cyberattacks that target specific high value organiza-
tions in sectors such as national defense, manufacturing, and the
financial industry [11, 31]. APTs use advanced attack methods,
including advanced exploits of zero-day vulnerabilities, as well
as highly-targeted spear phishing and other social engineering
techniques to gain access to a network and then remain unde-
tected for a prolonged period of time. The attacking strategies
of APTs are stealthy and are methodically designed to bypass
conventional security mechanisms to cause more permanent,
significant, and irreversible damages to the network.
Interaction of APTs with the network introduce information
flows in the form of control flow and command flow commands
which get recorded in the system log. Analyzing information
flows is thus a promising approach to detect presence of APTs
[12]. Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) [30] is a flow
tracking-based mechanism that is widely used to detect APTs.
DIFT tags information flows originating from suspicious input
channels in the network and tracks the propagation of the tagged
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flows. DIFT then initiates security check points, referred to as
traps, to analyze the tagged flows and verify the authenticity of
the flows. As the ratio of the malicious flows to the benign flows
is very small in the network, implementation of DIFT introduces
significant performance overhead on the network and generates
false-positives and false-negatives [12].
This paper models detection of APTs using a DIFT-based
detection mechanism. The effectiveness of detection depends
on both the security policy of the DIFT and also on the actions
of the APT. We model the strategic interaction between APTs
and DIFT as a stochastic game. The game unfolds on a state
space that is defined using the information flow graph (IFG)
constructed from the system log of the system. The objective
of the DIFT is to select locations in the system, i.e., nodes in
the IFG, to place the security check points while minimizing the
errors due to generation of false-positives and false-negatives.
On the other hand, the objective of the APT is to choose an attack
path starting from an entry point to a target node in the IFG. Note
that, while APTs aim to achieve a reachability objective, the aim
of DIFT is an optimal node selection. The APT-DIFT game
has imperfect information structure as APTs are unaware of the
locations at which DIFT places security check points and DIFT
is unaware of the path chosen by the APT for the attack. We
consider two scenarios of the game: (i) when the false-positive
and false-negative rates are known to both players and (ii) when
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the false-positive and false-negative rates are unknown to both
players. While case (i) is a complete information game, case (ii)
is an incomplete information game with unknown transition
probabilities.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We formulate a constant-sum stochastic game with total re-
ward structure that models the interaction between the DIFT
and APT. The game captures the information asymmetry
between the attacker and the defender, false-positives, and
false-negatives generated by DIFT.
• When the transition probabilities are known, we present a
value iteration algorithm to compute equilibrium strategy
and prove convergence and polynomial-time complexity.
• When the transition probabilities are unknown, we pro-
pose HSL (Hierarchical Supervised Learning), a supervised
learning-based algorithm to compute an approximate equi-
librium strategy of the incomplete information game. HSL
integrates a neural network with policy iteration and utilizes
the hierarchical structure of the state space of the APT-DIFT
game to guarantee convergence.
• We implement our algorithms on attack data, of a nation
state attack and a ransomware attack, collected using Re-
finable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system, and show the
convergence of the algorithm.
This paper is organized is as follows: Section 2 summarizes
the related work. Section 3 elaborates on information flow graph,
and the attacker and defender models. Section 4 presents the
formulation of the stochastic game between APT and DIFT. Sec-
tion 5 discusses the min-max solution concept used for solving
the game. Section 6 presents the value iteration algorithm for
the model-based approach and the supervised learning-based
approach for the model-free case. Section 7 illustrates the re-
sults and discussions on the experiments conducted. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Stochastic games model the strategic interactions in dynami-
cal systems and are well studied in the context of security games
[15], [33], economic games [1], and resilience of cyber-physical
systems [32]. While stochastic games provide a strong frame-
work for modeling security problems, often solving stochastic
games are hard. There exists dynamic programming-based ap-
proaches, value-iteration and policy iteration, for computing NE
strategies of these games. However, in many game formulations
dynamic programming-based approaches do not converge. Multi-
agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been pro-
posed in the literature to obtain NE strategies of zero-sum and
nonzero-sum stochastic games, when the game information such
as transition probabilities and payoff functions of the players are
unknown. However, algorithms with guaranteed convergence are
available only for special cases [8, 9, 22, 21]. A Nash-Q learning
algorithm is given in [9] that converges to NE of a general-sum
game when the NE is unique. The algorithm in [9] is guaran-
teed to converge for discounted games with perfect information
and unique NE. A Q-learning algorithm is presented in [8] for
discounted, constant-sum games with unknown transition proba-
bilities when the players have perfect information. A stochastic
approximation-based algorithm is presented in [22] for comput-
ing NE of discounted general-sum games with irreducible state
space. An adaptive policy approach using a regularized Lagrange
function is proposed in [21] for zero-sum games with unknown
transition probabilities and irreducible state space. While there
exist algorithms that converge to NE of the game for special
cases, there are no known algorithms to compute NE of a general
stochastic game with incomplete information structure.
Detection of APTs are analyzed using game theory in the
literature by modeling the interactions between APT and the de-
tection mechanism as a game. A dynamic game model is given
in [10] to detect APTs that can adopt adversarial deceptions.
A two-level evasion-detection game model is given in [28] for
detection of APTs. There has been some effort to model the
detection of APTs by a DIFT-based detection mechanism using
game-theoretic framework [19], [20], [25], and [27]. References
[20], [27] analyzed DIFT models with fixed taint sink (trap) lo-
cations. Later [19] extended the models in [20], [27] to a DIFT
model which selects the trap locations in a dynamic manner and
proposed a min-cut based solution approach. Detection of APTs
when the attack consists of multiple attackers, possibly with dif-
ferent capabilities, is studied in [25]. Note that, the game models
in [19], [20], [25], and [27] did not consider false-negative and
false-postive generation by DIFT and are hence non-stochastic.
Recently, stochastic models of APT-DIFT games was proposed
in [18], [26]. Reference [26] proposed a value iteration-based
algorithm to obtain an ε-NE of the discounted game and [18] pro-
posed a min-cut solution approach to compute an NE of the game.
Formulations in [18], [26] assume that the transition probabili-
ties of the game (false-positives and false-nagatives) are known.
DIFT-APT games with unknown transition probabilities are stud-
ied in [23], [24]. While reference [23] proposed a two-time scale
algorithm to compute an equilibrium of the discounted game,
[24] considered an average reward payoff structure. Moreover,
the game models in [23], [24] resulted in a unichain structure on
the state space of the game. Reference [16] studied DIFT-APT
games with unknown transition probabilities and average reward
payoff structure, when the state space graph is not a unichain
structure . The approach in [16] utilized an input convex neural
network architecture integrated with an alternating optimization
technique and presented empirical results to learn approximate
equilibrium strategies.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Information Flow Graph (IFG)
Information Flow Graph (IFG) provides a graphical rep-
resentation of the whole-system execution during the entire
period of monitoring. IFGs are widely used by analysts for
effective cyber response [7], [12]. IFGs are directed graphs,
where the nodes in the graph form entities such as processes,
files, network connections, and memory objects in the system.
Edges correspond to the system calls and are oriented in the
direction of the information flows and/or causality [7]. Let di-
rected graph G = (VG ,EG) represent IFG of the system, where
VG = {v1, . . . ,vN} and EG ⊆ VG ×VG . Given a system log, one
can build the corase-grained-IFG which is then pruned and re-
fined incrementally to obtain the corresponding IFG [12].
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3.2. Attacker Model
This paper consider advanced cyberattacks called as APTs.
APTs are information security threats that target sensitive infor-
mation in specific organizations. APTs enter into the system by
leveraging vulnerabilities in the system and implement multi-
ple sophisticated methods to continuously and stealthily steal
information [7]. A typical APT attack consists of multiple stages
initiated by a successful penetration and followed by initial com-
promise, C&C communications, privilege escalation, internal
reconnaissance, exfiltration, and cleanup [7]. Detection of APT
attacks are very challenging as the attacker activities blend in
seamlessly with normal system operation. Moreover, as APT
attacks are customized, they can not be detected using signature-
based detection methods such as firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, and antivirus software.
3.3. Defender Model
Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is a promis-
ing technique to detect security attacks on computer systems
[4, 5, 30]. DIFT tracks the system calls to detect the malicious
information flows from an adversary and to restrict the use of
these malicious flows. DIFT architecture is composed of (i) tag
sources, (ii) tag propagation rules, and (iii) tag sinks (traps). Tag
sources are the suspicious locations in the system, such as key-
boards, network interface, and hard disks, that are tagged/tainted
as suspicious by DIFT. Tags are single bit or multiple bit mark-
ings depending on the level of granularity manageable with the
available memory and resources. All the processed values of
the tag sources are tagged and DIFT tracks the propagation of
the tagged flows. When anomalous behavior is detected in the
system, DIFT initiates security analysis and tagged flows are in-
spected by DIFT at specific locations, referred to as traps. DIFT
conducts fine grain analysis at traps to detect the attack and to
perform risk assessment. While tagging and trapping using DIFT
is a promising detection mechanism against APTs, DIFT intro-
duces performance overhead on the system. Performing security
analysis (trapping) of tagged flows uses considerable amount
of memory of the system [6]. Thus there is a tradeoff between
system log granularity and performance [12].
4. Problem Formulation
This section formulates the interaction between the APT and
the DIFT-based defense mechanism as a stochastic game where
the decisions taken by the adversary (APT) and the defender
(DIFT), referred to as agents/players, influences the system be-
havior. The objective of the adversary is to choose transitions
in the IFG so as to reach the destination node set D ⊂VG from
the set of entry points λ ⊂VG . On the other hand, the objective
of the defender is to dynamically choose locations to trap the
information flow so as to detect any possible attack in the sys-
tem. The state of the system denotes the location of the tagged
information flow in the system. The defender cannot distinguish
a malicious and a benign flow. On the other hand, the adversary
does not know if the tagged flow will get trapped by the defender
while choosing a transition. Thus the game is an imperfect infor-
mation game. The system’s current state and the joint actions of
the agents together determine a probability distribution over the
possible next states of the system.
4.1. State Space
The state of the game at a time step t, denoted as st , is defined
as the position of the tagged information flow in the system. Let
S= {v0,v1, . . . ,vN ,φ ,τA,τB} be the finite state space of the game.
Here, st = φ denotes the state when the tagged flow drops out
by abandoning the attack, st = τA denotes the state when DIFT
detects the adversary after performing the security analysis, and
st = τB denotes the state when DIFT performs security analysis
and concludes a benign flow as malicious (false positive). Let D
be the destination (target) node set of the adversary and |D|= q.
Without loss of generality, let D = {v1,v2, . . . ,vq}. We assume
that both agents know the IFG and the destination set D. The
state v0 corresponds to a virtual state that denote the starting
point of the game. In the state space S, v0 is connected to all
nodes in λ . Thus the state of the game at t = 0 is s0 = v0.
4.2. Action Spaces
At every time instant in the game, the players choose their
actions from their respective action sets. The action set of the ad-
versary is defined as the possible set of transitions the adversarial
flow can execute at a state. The defender has limited resources
and hence can perform security analysis at one information flow
at a time. Thus the defender’s action set is defined such that, at
every decision point, the defender chooses one node to perform
security analysis, among the possible nodes that the adversary
can transition to.
Let the action set of the adversary and the defender at a state
st be AA(st) and AD(st), respectively. At a state st ∈ VG , the
adversary chooses an action either to drop out, i.e., abort the
attack, or to continue the attack by transitioning to a neighboring
node. Thus AA(st) := {φ}∪{v j : st = vi and (vi,v j) ∈ EG}. On
the other hand, the defender’s action set at state st AD(st) :=
{0} ∪ {v j : st = vi and (vi,v j) ∈ EG}, where AD(st) = 0 rep-
resents that the tagged information flow is not trapped and
AD(st) = v j represents that defender decides to perform security
analysis at the node v j ∈VG at instant t.
The game originates at t = 0 with state s0 = v0 with
AA(v0) := λ and AD(v0) := 0. The definition of action sets
at v0 captures the fact that the adversarial flow originates at one
of the entry points. Performing security analysis at entry points
can not detect the attack as there are not enough traces to analyze.
Moreover, the game terminates at time t if the state of the game
st ∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D. The set of states {φ ,τA,τB}∪D are referred
to as the absorbing states of the game. For st ∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D,
AD(st) = AA(st) = /0. At a non-absorbing state, the players
choose their actions from their respective action set and the game
evolves until the state of the game is an absorbing state.
4.3. Transitions
The transition probabilities of the game are governed by
the uncertainty associated with DIFT. DIFT is not capable of
performing security analysis accurately due to the generation
of false-positives and false-negatives. Consider a tagged flow
incoming at node vi ∈ VG at time t. Let the action chosen by
the defender and the adversary at st be dt and at , respectively.
If defender chooses not to trap an information flow, then the
flow proceeds to the node in G chosen by the adversary. That
is, if dt = 0, then st+1 = at . If the defender chooses to trap the
node at which the adversary also decides to transition to, then the
adversary is detected with probability 1−FN(dt) and the flow
iii
transition to the node in G corresponding to the action of the
adversary with the remaining probability. That is, if dt = at = vi,
then st+1 = τA with probability 1−FN(dt) and st+1 = at with
probability FN(dt). If the defender decides to trap a node which
is not the node the adversary decides to transition to, then the
defender generates a false-positive with probability FP(dt) and
the flow transition to the node in G corresponding to the action
of the adversary with the remaining probability. That is, if dt 6= 0
and dt 6= at , then st+1 = τB with probability FP(dt) and st+1 = at
with probability 1−FP(dt).
Let P(st ,st ,dt ,st+1) denote the probability of transitioning
to a state st+1 from a state st under actions at and dt . Then,
P(st ,at ,dt ,st+1) =

1, st+1 = at , if dt = 0
FN(dt), st+1 = at , if dt = at
1−FN(dt), st+1 = τA, if dt = at
FP(dt), st+1 = τB, if dt 6= at
1−FP(dt), st+1 = at , if dt 6= at
(1)
The transition probabilities FN(vi),FP(vi), for vi ∈VG , denote
the rates of generation of false-negatives and false-positives, re-
spectively, at the different nodes in the IFG. Note that, different
nodes in IFG have different capabilities to perform security anal-
ysis and depending on that the value of FN(·) and FP(·) are
different. The numerical values of these transition probabilities
also depend on the type of the attack. As APTs are tailored at-
tacks that can manipulate the system operation and evade conven-
tional security mechanisms such as firewalls, anti-virus software,
and intrusion-detection systems, FN(·)’s and FP(·)’s are often
unknown and hard to estimate accurately.
4.4. Strategies
A strategy for a player is a mapping which yields probability
distribution over the player’s actions at every state. Consider
mixed (stochastic) and stationary player strategies. When the
strategy is stationary, the probability of choosing an action at
a state depends only on the current state of the game. Let the
stationary strategy space of the attacker be PA and that of the
defender be PD. Then, PA : S→ [0,1]|AA| and PD : S→ [0,1]|AD|.
Let pA ∈ PA and pD ∈ PD. Here, pD = [pD(vq+1), . . . , pD(vN)],
where pD(vi) denotes the probability distribution over all the
actions of the defender at state vi, i.e., out-neighboring nodes of vi
in IFG and not trapping. For pA = [pA(v0), pA(vq+1), . . . , pA(vN)],
pA(vi) is a probability distribution over all possible out-neighbors
of the node vi in the IFG and φ . Note that, AA(st) =AD(st) = /0,
for st ∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D. Also, AD(v0) = /0.
4.5. Payoffs
Consider a total payoff criteria which is the total expected
reward until some target set of states are reached. The payoff
structure of the game is set up such that the players receive
payoffs at the absorbing states of the game. At state τA DIFT
receives a payoff of β and APT receives 0 payoff. At state τB
the APT receives a payoff of β and DIFT receives 0 payoff. At a
state in the set D = {v1,v2, . . . ,vq}, APT receives a payoff of β
and DIFT receives 0 payoff. At state φ DIFT receives a payoff
of β and APT receives 0 payoff.
Let the payoff of player k at an absorbing state st be rk(st),
where k ∈ {A,D}. Then,
rA(st) =

β , st ∈D
β , st = τB
0, otherwise
(2)
rD(st) =

β , st = τA
β , st = φ
0, otherwise
(3)
At each stage in game, st at time t, both players simultaneously
choose their action at and dt and transition to a next state st+1.
This is continued until they reach an absorbing state and receive
the payoff defined using Eqs. (2) and (3).
Let T denote termination time of the game, i.e., st+1 = st for
t > T . At the termination time sT ∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D. Let UA and
UD denote the payoff functions of the adversary and the defender,
respectively. As the initial state of the game is v0, for a strategy
pair (pA, pD) the expected payoffs of the players are
UA(v0, pA, pD)=Ev0,pA,pD
[
T
∑
t=0
rA(st)
]
= Ev0,pA,pD
[
rA(sT )
]
, (4)
UD(v0, pA, pD)=Ev0,pA,pD
[
T
∑
t=0
rD(st)
]
= Ev0,pA,pD
[
rD(sT )
]
,(5)
where Ev0,pA,pD denotes the expectation with respect to pA and
pD when the game originates at state v0. The objective of APT
and DIFT is to individually maximize their expected total payoff
given in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), respectively. Thus the optimization
problem solved by DIFT is
max
pD∈PD
UD(v0, pA, pD). (6)
Similarly, the optimization problem of the APT is
max
pA∈PA
UA(v0, pA, pD). (7)
To bring out the structure of the payoffs well, we let Rs0(s)
be the cumulative probability with which the state of the game at
the termination time is s, when the game originates at s0. With
slight abuse of notation, we use Rs0(D) to denote the cumulative
probability with which the state of the game at the termination
time lies in set D, when the game originates at s0. At the time of
termination, i.e., t = T , the state of the game satisfies one of the
following: (i) sT = τA, (ii) sT = τB, (iii) sT ∈D, and (iv) sT = φ .
Using these definitions Eqs. (4) and (5) can be rewritten as
UA(v0, pA, pD) =
(
Rs0(D)+Rs0(τB)
)
β , (8)
UD(v0, pA, pD) =
(
Rs0(τA)+Rs0(φ)
)
β . (9)
Using the reformulation of the payoff functions, we present
the following property of the APT-DIFT game.
Proposition 4.1. The APT-DIFT stochastic game is a constant
sum game.
Proof. Recall that APT-DIFT game has absorbing states φ ,τA,τB
and D. At the termination time of the game, i.e., t = T , the state
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of the game sT ∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D. This implies
Rs0(φ)+Rs0(τA)+Rs0(τB)+Rs0(D) = 1.
This gives UA(v0, pA, pD)+UD(v0, pA, pD) =
(
Rs0(φ)+Rs0(τA)+
Rs0(τB) +Rs0(D)
)
β = β . Thus the game between APT and
DIFT is a constant sum game with constant equal to β .
5. Solution Concept
The solution concept of the game is defined as follows. Each
player is interested in maximizing their individual reward in the
minimax sense. In other words, each player is assuming the worst
case for an optimal opponent player. Since the APT-DIFT game
is a constant-sum game, it is sufficient to view that the opponent
player is acting to minimize the reward of the agent. Thus DIFT
chooses its actions to find an optimal strategy p?D that achieves
the upper value defined as
V (s0) = max
pD∈PD
min
pA∈PA
UD(v0, pA, pD). (10)
On the other hand, APT chooses its actions to find an optimal
strategy p?A that achieves
max
pA∈PA
min
pD∈PD
UA(v0, pA, pD) = max
pA∈PA
min
pD∈PD
(
β −UD(v0, pA, pD)
)
.
(11)
This is equivalent to saying that APT aims to find an optimal
strategy p?A that achieves the lower value defined as
V(s0) = min
pA∈PA
max
pD∈PD
UD(v0, pA, pD). (12)
From Eqs. (10) and (12), the defender tries to maximize and the
adversary tries to minimize UD(v0, pA, pD). Hence the value of
the game is defined as
V ?(s0) := max
pD∈PD
UD(v0, p?A, pD) =UD(v0, p
?
A, p
?
D)
= min
pA∈PA
UD(v0, pA, p?D). (13)
The strategy pair (p?A, p
?
D) is referred to as the saddle point or
Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game.
Definition 5.1. Let (p?A, p?D) be a Nash equilibrium of the APT-
DIFT game. A strategy pair (pA, pD) is said to be an ε−Nash
equilibrium, for ε > 0, if
UD(v0, pA, pD)>UD(v0, p?A, p?D)− ε.
In other words, the value corresponding to the strategy pair
(pA, pD) denoted as V (s0) satisfies
V (s0)>V ?(s0)− ε.
Proposition 5.2 proves the existence of NE for the APT-DIFT
game.
Proposition 5.2. There exists a Nash equilibrium for the APT-
DIFT stochastic game.
Proof. Note that, the APT-DIFT game is a stochastic game with
finite state space and finite action spaces for both players. The
transition probabilities in the game FP(·) and FN(·) are such
that 0 < FP(·)< 1 and 0 < FN(·)< 1. Thus the stopping proba-
bilities of the APT-DIFT game are nonzero, for all strategy pairs
(pA, pD) except for a deterministic policy in which the defender
does not perform security analysis at any state. However, such
a policy is trivially irrelevant to the game as the defender is
idle and essentially participating in the game. The class of zero-
sum, finite, stochastic games with nonzero stopping (termination)
probability has Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies [29]. As
the result for zero-sum games also hold for constant-sum games,
there exists an NE for the APT-DIFT game.
In the next section we present our approach to compute an
NE of the APT-DIFT game.
6. Solution to the APT-DIFT Game
This section presents our approach to compute an NE of the
APT-DIFT game. Firstly, we propose a model-based approach to
compute NE using a value iteration algorithm. Later, we present
a model-free approach based on a policy iteration algorithm,
when the transition probabilities, i.e., the rate of false-positives
and false-negatives, are unknown.
6.1. Value Iteration Algorithm
This subsection presents our solution approach for solving
the APT-DIFT game when the false-positive and false-negative
rates (transition probabilities) are known. By Proposition 5.2,
there exists an NE for the APT-DIFT game. Our approach to
compute NE of the APT-DIFT game is presented below.
Let s ∈ S be an arbitrary state of the APT-DIFT game. The
state value function for a constant-sum game, analogous to the
Bellman equation, can be written as
V ?(s) = max
pD(s)∈PD(s)
min
a∈AA(s) ∑d∈AD(s)
Q?(s,a,d) pD(s,d), (14)
where the Q-values are defined as
Q?(s,a,d) = ∑
s′∈S
P(s,a,d,s′)V ?(s′). (15)
Note that the min in Eq. (14) can also be defined over mixed
(stochastic) policies, but, since it is ‘inside’ the max, the min-
imum is achieved for a deterministic action choice [14]. The
strategy selected by Eq. (14) is referred to as the minimax strat-
egy, and given by
p?D(s) = arg max
pD(s)∈PD(s)
min
a∈AA(s) ∑d∈AD(s)
Q?(s,a,d) pD(s,d). (16)
The aim here is to compute minimax strategy p?D. Our proposed
algorithm and convergence proof is given below.
Let V = {V (s) : s ∈ S} denote the value vector correspond-
ing to a strategy pair (pA, pD). Note that, the value for a state
s ∈ S, V (s), is the expected payoff under strategy pair (pA, pD)
if the game originates at state s. Then, V ?(s) is the expected
payoff corresponding to an NE strategy pair (p?A, p
?
D) if the game
originates at state s. Algorithm 6.1 presents the pseudocode to
compute the value vector of the APT-DIFT game.
Algorithm 6.1 is a value iteration algorithm defined on a
value vector V = {V (s) : s ∈ S}, where V (s) is the value of the
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Algorithm 6.1 Value iteration algorithm to find NE strategy in
APT-DIFT game
Input: APT-DIFT game with state space S, destination set D,
action space AD,AA, payoff parameter β , transition probabili-
ties FN(·),FP(·)
Output: Value vector Vˆ and defender policy pˆD
1: Initialize value vector V (0)(s) ← 0, for all s ∈ S and
V (1)(s′) ← β for s′ ∈ {τA,φ}, V (1)(s′′) ← 0 for all s′′ ∈
S\{τA,φ}, k← 0, δ > 0
2: while max{|V (k+1)(s)−V (k)(s)| : s ∈ S}> δ do
3: k← k+1
4: for s /∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D do
5: V (k+1)(s)←
6: max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)
∑
s′∈S
∑
d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V (k)(s′)
7: end for
8: end while
9: return Vector Vˆ , where Vˆ (s)←V (k)(s)
10: Compute DIFT strategy pˆD, pˆD(s) ←
arg max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)
∑
s′∈S
∑
d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)Vˆ (s′)
game starting at the state s. Thus V (s) = β , for s ∈ {φ ,τA}, and
V (s′) = 0, for s′ ∈ {τB}∪D. The values of the states is computed
recursively, for every iteration k = 1,2, . . ., V (k)(s), as follows:
V (k)(s) =

β , if s ∈ {φ ,τA},
0, if s ∈ {τB}∪D,
val(s,V (k−1)), otherwise,
(17)
where val(s,V (k−1)) =
max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)∑s′∈S ∑d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V (k−1)(s′).
The value-iteration algorithm computes a sequence V (0),
V (1), V (2), . . ., where for k = 0,1,2 . . ., each valuation V (k) asso-
ciates with each state s ∈ S a lower bound V (k)(s) on the value of
the game. Note that, Algorithm 6.1 need not terminate in finitely
many iterations. However, we prove that as k approaches ∞,
the values V (k)(s) approaches the exact values V (s) from below,
i.e., limk→∞V (k)(s) converges to the value of the game at state s.
Theorem 6.2 proves the asymptotic convergence of the values.
Lemma 6.1. Consider the value iteration algorithm in Algo-
rithm 6.1. Let V (k+1) and V (k) be the value vectors corresponding
to iterations k+1 and k, respectively. Then, V (k+1)(s)>V (k)(s),
for all s ∈ S.
Proof. We first prove that result for a state s ∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D.
From Eq. (17), for every iteration k= 1,2, . . .V (k)(s)= β , for s∈
{φ ,τA}, and V (k)(s)= 0, for s∈{τB}∪D. From the initialization
step of Algorithm 6.1 (Step 1), V (0)(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. Thus
for any state s, where s∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D, V (k+1)(s)>V (k)(s) for
any arbitrary iteration k of Algorithm 6.1.
For an arbitrary state s, where s ∈ S \ {φ ,τA,τB} ∪D, we
prove the result using an induction argument. The induc-
tion hypothesis is that arbitrary iterations k and k+ 1 satisfy
V (k+1)(s)>V (k)(s), for all s ∈ S\{φ ,τA,τB}∪D.
Base step: Consider k = 0 as the base step. Initialize V (0)(s) = 0
for all s ∈ S \ {φ ,τA,τB} ∪D and set V (1)(s) = 0 for all s ∈
S \ {φ ,τA,τB} ∪D. This gives V (1)(s) > V (0)(s), for all s ∈
S\{φ ,τA,τB}∪D.
Induction step: For the induction step, assume that iteration k
satisfies V (k)(s)>V (k−1)(s) for all s ∈ S\{φ ,τA,τB}∪D.
Consider iteration (k+1). Then,
V (k+1)(s) =max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)∑s′∈S ∑d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V (k)(s′)
> min
a∈AA(s)∑s′∈S ∑d∈AD(s)
p(k)D (s,d)P(s,a,d,s
′)V (k)(s′) (18)
> min
a∈AA(s)∑s′∈S ∑d∈AD(s)
p(k)D (s,d)P(s,a,d,s
′)V (k−1)(s′) (19)
=max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)∑s′∈S ∑d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V (k−1)(s′)
= V (k)(s) (20)
Eq. (18) holds as the value obtained using a maximizing
policy is at least as the value obtained using a specific policy pD.
Eq. (19) follows from the induction argument and Eq. (20) is
from the definition of V (k)(s). This completes the proof.
Using Lemma 6.1, we prove the convergence result of Algo-
rithm 6.1.
Theorem 6.2. Consider the value iteration algorithm in Algo-
rithm 6.1. Let V (k)(s),V ?(s) be the value at iteration k and
the optimal value of state s ∈ S, respectively. Then, as k→ ∞,
V (k)(s) → V ?(s), for all s ∈ S. Further, the output of Algo-
rithm 6.1, pˆD, for δ → 0, is an optimal defender policy.
Proof. Note that, the value of any state s ∈ S is bounded above
by β . Also, the sequence V (k)(s) is a monotonically increasing
sequence. By the monotone convergence theorem, a bounded
and monotone sequence converges to the supremum.
Thus limk→∞V (k)(s)→V ?(s), for all s ∈ S.
For δ → 0, V (k+1)(s) = V (k)(s). Then limk→∞V (k)(s) =
V (k)(s) =V ?(s). Thus the policy
pˆD(s)= arg max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)∑s′∈S ∑d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V (k)(s′)
= arg max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)∑s′∈S ∑d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V ?(s′)
= p?D(s).
This proves the result.
Theorem 6.3. For any ε > 0, Algorithm 6.1 returns an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the APT-DIFT game.
Proof. Note that, V (0),V (1), . . . is a monotonic bounded se-
quence. Thus there exists a limit point, say V∞, for the se-
quence. For any arbitrarily small δ > 0, there exists a k such
that |V (k)−V∞|< ε . Thus by definition of ε−Nash equilibrium
(Definition 5.1) and Theorem 6.2, Algorithm 6.1 returns an ε-
Nash equilibrium of the APT-DIFT game, for any ε > 0, in finite
number of iterations.
The complexity result of Algorithm 6.1 is presented below.
Theorem 6.4. Consider the APT-DIFT game with N number
of nodes in the IFG and q number of destination nodes. Let
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AA and AD be the action sets of APT and DIFT, respectively.
Every iteration of Algorithm 6.1 has computational complexity
O((N−q+1)2|AA||AD|).
Proof. Every iteration of Algorithm 6.1 involves computation
of the value vector. This involves solving, for every state s ∈
S\{{φ ,τA,τB}∪D}, a linear program of the form:
Maximize V (s)
Subject to:(1) ∑
d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d) = 1
(2) pD(s,d)> 0, for all d ∈AD(s)
(3) V (s) 6 ∑
d∈AD(s)
Q(s,d,a)pD(s,d), for all a ∈
AA(s).
Note that |S \ {{φ ,τA,τB} ∪D}| = N − q+ 1. The above
linear program has complexity of O((N−q+1)|AA||AD|) [2].
Thus solving for all (N−q+1) states has a total complexity of
O((N−q+1)2|AA||AD|).
Algorithm 6.1 is guaranteed to converge to an NE strategy
asymptotically. When the state space of the APT-DIFT game
has cycles, Algorithm 6.1 updates the value vector recursively
and consequently finite time convergence can not be guaran-
teed. However, when the IFG is acyclic, the state space of the
APT-DIFT game is acyclic (Theorem 6.5) and a finite time con-
vergence can be achieved using value iteration.
Theorem below presents a termination condition of the APT-
DIFT game when the IFG is acyclic.
Theorem 6.5. Consider the APT-DIFT game. Let Assump-
tion 6.9 holds and N be the number of nodes in the IFG. Then
the state space of the APT-DIFT game is acyclic and the game
terminates in at most N+4 number of steps.
Proof. Consider any arbitrary strategy pair (pA, pD). We first
prove the acyclic property of the state space of the game under
(pA, pD). The state space S is constructed by augmenting the IFG
with states v0,φ , τA, and τB. Note that a state s ∈ {φ ,τA,τB}∪D
does not lie in a cycle in S as s is an absorbing state and hence
have no outgoing edge, i.e., AA(s) = AD(s) = /0. The state v0
does not lie in a cycle in S as there are no incoming edges to
v0. This concludes that a state s ∈ {v0,φ ,τA,τB}∪D is not part
of a cycle in S. Thus a cycle can possibly exist in S only if
there is a cycle which has some states in vq+1, . . . ,vN , since
D = {v1,v2, . . . ,vq}. Recall that states v1, . . . ,vN correspond to
nodes of G. As G is acyclic, there are no cycles in S. Since S is
acyclic under any arbitrary strategy pair (pA, pD) and the state
space has finite cardinality, the game terminates in finite number
of steps. Further, since |S|= N+4, T 6 N+4.
Using Theorem 6.5, we propose a value iteration algorithm
with guaranteed finite time convergence. We will use the follow-
ing definition in our approach.
For a directed acyclic graph, topological ordering of the node
set is defined below.
Definition 6.6 ([13]). A topological ordering of a directed graph
is a linear ordering of its vertices such that for every directed
edge (u,v) from vertex u to vertex v, u comes before v in the
ordering.
For a directed acyclic graph with vertex set B and edge set E
there exists an algorithm of complexity O(|B|+ |E|) to find the
Algorithm 6.2 Value iteration algorithm to find NE strategy for
APT-DIFT game under Assumption 6.2
Input: APT-DIFT game with state space S, destination set D,
action space AD,AA, payoff parameter β , transition probabili-
ties FN(·),FP(·)
Output: Value vector V ? and defender strategy p?D
1: Find the topological ordering of the state space graph, S
2: Using S , obtain the set of nodes corresponding to hierarchi-
cal levels L1,L2, . . . ,LM
3: Initialize value vector V (s)← 0, for all s ∈ S and V (s′)← β
for s′ ∈ {τA,φ}, V (s′′)← 0 for all s′′ ∈ S\{τA,φ}
4: for k ∈ {M−1,M−2, . . . ,1} do
5: for s ∈ Lk do
6: V (s)← max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)
∑
s′∈S
∑
d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V (s′)
7: end for
8: k← k+1
9: end for
10: return Value vector V ?←V
11: Compute DIFT strategy p?D, p
?
D(s) ←
arg max
pD∈PD
min
a∈AA(s)
∑
s′∈S
∑
d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V ?(s′)
topological order [13]. Using the topological ordering, one can
find a hierarchical level partitioning of the nodes of a directed
acyclic graph. Let S be the topologically ordered set of nodes
of S. Let the number of hierarchical levels associated with S
be M, say L1,L2, . . . ,LM . Then L1 = v0, LM = {φ ,τA,τB}∪D.
Moreover, a state s is said to be in hierarchical level L j if there
exists an edge into s from a state s′ which is in some level L j′ ,
where j′ < j, and there is no edge into s from a state s′′ which is
in level L j′′ , where j′′ > j.
Algorithm 6.2 presents the pseudocode to solve the APT-
DIFT game using the topological ordering and the hierarchical
levels, when the IFG is acyclic.
Corollary 6.7. Consider the APT-DIFT game and let AA,AD
be the action sets of APT, DIFT, respectively. Let the IFG
is acyclic with N number of nodes and q number of desti-
nation nodes. Then, Algorithm 6.2 returns the value vector
V ?. Moreover, Algorithm 6.2 has computational complexity
O((N−q+1)2|AA||AD|).
Proof. Recall that under Assumption 6.9, the state space S of
the APT-DIFT game is acyclic. Thus the topological ordering S
and the hierarchical levels, L1, . . . ,LM , of S can be obtained in
polynomial time [13]. Note that, values at the absorbing states,
i.e., states at hierarchical level M, are V (s) = β for s ∈ {τA,φ}
and V (s′) = 0 for all s′ ∈ {τB}∪D. Using the hierarchical levels,
the value vector can be computed in a dynamic programming
manner starting from states in the last hierarchical level. Initially,
using the values of the states at level M, the values of states at
level M−1 can be obtained. Similarly, using values of states at
level M−1 and level M, the values of states at level M−2 can
be obtained and so on. By recursive computations we obtain the
value vector V ? and the corresponding DIFT strategy p?D.
Finding the topological ordering and the corresponding hi-
erarchical levels of the state space graph has O(|S|2) compu-
tations. The linear program associated with each state in the
value iteration involves O((N−q+1)|AA||AD|) computations
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(See proof of Theorem 6.4). Since we need to compute values
corresponding to (N−q+1) states, complexity of Algorithm 6.2
is O((N−q+1)2|AA||AD|).
6.2. Hierarchical Supervised Learning (HSL) Algorithm
This subsection presents our approach to solve the APT-
DIFT game when the game model is not fully known. It is often
unrealistic to know the precise values of the false-positive rates
and the false-negative rates of DIFT as these values are estimated
empirically. More specifically, the transition probabilities of the
APT-DIFT game are unknown. The traditional reinforcement
learning algorithms (Q-learning) for constant-sum games with
unknown transition probabilities [8] assume perfect information,
i.e., the players can observe the past actions and rewards of
the opponents [8]. As a result, reinforcement learning-based
algorithms can not solve the APT-DIFT game, as the information
structure is imperfect.
On the other hand, dynamic programming-based approaches,
including value iteration and policy iteration algorithms, require
the transition probabilities in the computations. When FN(·)
and FP(·) values are unknown, the optimization problem asso-
ciated with the states in step 6 of Algorithm 6.1 and step 6 of
Algorithm 6.2 can not be solved. That is, in the LP
Problem 6.8. Maximize V (s)
Subject to:(1) ∑
d∈AD(s)
pD(s,d) = 1
(2) pD(s,d)> 0, for all d ∈AD(s)
(3) V (s) 6 ∑
d∈AD(s)
Q(s,d,a)pD(s,d), for all a ∈
AA(s),
the Q(s,a,d) values are unknown, where
Q(s,a,d) = ∑
s′∈S
P(s,a,d,s′)V (s′),
and P(s,a,d,s′) is defined in Eq. (1). To this end, we propose
a supervised learning-based approach to solve the APT-DIFT
game. Our approach consists of two key steps.
(1) Training a neural network to approximate the value vector
of the game for a given strategy pair, and
(2) A policy iteration algorithm to compute an ε-optimal NE
strategy.
Also, our approach is based on the following assumption.
Assumption 6.9. The IFG G is acyclic.
The IFG obtained from the system log may not be acyclic
in general. However, when the IFG is a cyclic graph, one can
obtain an acyclic representation of the IFG using the node ver-
sioning technique proposed in [7]. Throughout this subsection,
we consider directed acyclic IFGs rendered using the approach
in [7] and hence Assumption 6.9 is non-restrictive.
Our approach to solve the APT-DIFT game, when the rates
of false-positives and false-negatives are unknown, utilizes the
topological ordering and the hierarchical levels of the state space
graph. We propose a hierarchical supervised learning (HSL)-
based approach, that predicts the Q-values of the APT-DIFT
game and then solve the LP for all the states (Problem 6.8) in a
hierarchical manner, to approximate an NE strategy of the APT-
DIFT game. In order to predict the Q-values of the game, we
train a neural network to learn the value vector of the game and
use the trained model to predict the Q-values. The reasons to
train an NN to learn the value vector instead of directly learning
the Q-values are: (a) while the value vector is of dimension |S|
the Q-values have dimension |S||AA||AD| and (b) generation of
data samples for value vector is easy. The approach for data
generation and training is elaborated below.
Note that, it is possible to simulate the APT-DIFT game and
observe the final game outcome, i.e., the payoffs of the players.
For a given (pA, pD), the value at state s, V (s), is the payoff of the
defender if the game originate at state s, i.e., V (s)=UD(s, pA, pD).
Training the neural network for predicting the value vector of the
APT-DIFT game consists of two steps.
(i) Generate random samples of strategy pairs, (pA, pD)
(ii) Simulate the APT-DIFT game for each of the randomly
generated sample of strategy pair and obtain the values
corresponding to all states.
The neural network takes as input the strategy pairs and out-
puts the value vector. The training is done using a multi-input,
multi-output neural network denoted as F . Note that the neural
network may not compute the exact value vector, however, it can
approximate the value vector to arbitrary accuracy. It is known
that for any given ξ > 0, by using enough hidden neurons it is
always possible to find a neural network whose output approxi-
mates the unknown functions at least to ξ -accuracy1. In other
words, the approximation will be good to within the desired
accuracy for every possible input. However, the training method
does not guarantee that the neural network obtained at the end
of the training process is one that satisfies the specified level
of accuracy. Using the trained neural network we predict the
Q-values of the game.
Lemma 6.10. Consider the APT-DIFT game with state space S.
Let a neural network is trained using samples of strategy pairs
(pA, pD) to predict the value vector V of the game. Then, the
trained neural network also yield the Q-values, Q(s,a,d), for all
s ∈ S, a ∈AA, and d ∈AD.
Proof. Consider a neural network that is trained using enough
samples of strategy pairs to predict the value vector of the
game. Thus given a strategy pair (pA, pD), the neural net-
work predicts V = {V (s) : s ∈ S}. Consider an arbitrary state
s. The Q-value corresponding to state s and action pair a,d
for the APT and DIFT, respectively, is given by Q(s,a,d) =
∑s′∈S P(s,a,d,s′)V (s′). For a strategy (pA, pD) with pA(s) such
that pA(s,a) = 1 and pD(s) such that pD(s,d) = 1 gives
V (s) = ∑
s′∈S
∑
a∈AA
∑
d∈AD
pA(s,a)pD(s,d)P(s,a,d,s′)V (s′)
= ∑
s′∈S
P(s,a,d,s′)V (s′)
= Q(s,a,d).
Hence the Q-values of the game can be obtained using the neural
network that is trained to predict the value vector by inputting a
1Given a function f (x) and ξ > 0, the guarantee is that by using enough
hidden neurons it is always possible to find a neural network whose output g(x)
satisfies | f (x)−g(x)|< ξ , for all inputs x.
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strategy pair (pA, pD) with pA(s,a) = 1 and pD(s,d) = 1, for any
s ∈ S, a ∈AA, and d ∈AD.
Using the trained neural network we run a policy iteration
algorithm. In the policy iteration, we update the strategies of
both players, APT and DIFT, by solving the stage games in a
dynamic programming manner. The details of the algorithm are
presented below.
Algorithm 6.3 HSL Algorithm for APT-DIFT game
Input: APT-DIFT game with state space S, destination set D,
action sets AA,AD, payoff parameter β
Output: Value vector Vˆ and defender strategy pˆD
1: Generate random samples of (pA, pD) and value vector
2: Train F using the data set from Step 1
3: Find the topological ordering of the state space graph, S
4: Obtain the set of nodes corresponding to hierarchical levels
L1,L2, . . . ,LM
5: Initialize V (τA)← β , V (φ)← β , V (τB)← 0, and V (s)← 0
for s ∈D
6: Initialize randomly (pˆ(M−1)A , pˆ
(M−1)
D )
7: for k ∈ {M−1,M−2, . . . ,1} do
8: for s ∈ Lk do
9: for a ∈AA(s),d ∈AD(s) do
10: Update (pˆ(k)A , pˆ
(k)
D ) such that pˆ
(k)
A (s,a) = 1 and
pˆ(k)D (s,d) = 1
11: Predict the value vector Vˆ using the neural net-
work F , Vˆ ← F(pˆ(k)A , pˆ(k)D )
12: Assign Qˆ(s,a,d)← Vˆ (s)
13: end for
14: Assign Q(s,a,d)← Qˆ(s,a,d) and solve Problem 6.8
for s to obtain V (s) and pD(s)
15: Update pˆ(k)D such that pˆ
(k)
D (s)← pD(s)
16: Find the action corresponding to the minimum entry
of the vector Qˆ(s,a,d) pˆ(k)D (s,d), say aˆ
17: Update pˆ(k)A such that pˆ
(k)
A (s, aˆ)← 1
18: end for
19: end for
20: return pˆD← pˆ(k)D
Algorithm 6.3 presents the pseudocode for our HSL algo-
rithm to solve the APT-DIFT game. Initially we generate random
samples of strategy pairs (pA, pD) and value vector V and train a
neural network. Using the trained neural network, we propose a
strategy iteration algorithm. As Assumption 6.9 holds, the state
space graph S is acyclic. Thus one can compute the topological
ordering (Step 3) and the hierarchical levels (Step 4) of S in poly-
nomial time. The values at the absorbing states are known and
are hence set as V (τA) =V (φ) = β , V (τB) = 0, and V (s) = 0 for
all s ∈D. As the values of the states at level M are known, the
algorithm begins with level M−1. Initially the strategies of APT
and DIFT are randomly set to pˆ(M−1)A and pˆ
(M−1)
D , respectively.
Then we compute the Q-values of all the states using the trained
neural network, following the hierarchical order. Note that, due
to the hierarchical structure of the state space, computation of Q-
value of a state in jth hierarchical level depends only on the states
that are at levels higher than j. Consider level M−1 and an arbi-
trary state s in level M−1. The Q-values of s are predicted using
the trained neural network by selecting suitable deterministic
Figure 1: An example of a multi-stage APT attack scenario (Figure 1(a)).
An illustrative diagram of the IFG G (Figure 1(b)) and the corresponding
multi-stage IFG Gm (Figure 1(b)) that consists of three stages of the
attack, i.e., m = 3. The propagation of the attack from stage j of the
attack to stage ( j+1) is captured in Gm by connecting the destination
nodesD j in stage j to their respective nodes in stage ( j+1), for j= 1,2.
strategy pairs. That is, for predicting Q(s,a,d), choose strategies
such that pˆ(M−1)A (s,a) = 1 and pˆ
(M−1)
D (s,d) = 1 as input to the
neural network. Using the Q-values of state s, solve the LP and
obtain value vector, DIFT strategy, and the optimal action of the
APT. The strategies pˆ(M−1)A and pˆ
(M−1)
D are updated using the
output of the LP such that the pˆ(M−1)A (s) and pˆ
(M−1)
D (s) corre-
sponds to an NE strategy. Once the strategies of both players are
updated for all the states in level M−1, the process continues
for level M−2 and so on.
In HSL algorithm, the prediction of Q-values using the neural
network (Step 8-12) corresponding to states in a particular level
can be run parallel. To elaborate, let there are x number of states
in level L j. Then select an action pair (a,d) corresponding to
each state and run the prediction step of the algorithm. Thus,
every run of the neural network can predict x number of Q-values,
for x different states.
Remark: APT attacks typically consist of multiple stages,
e.g., initial compromise, internal reconnaissance, foothold estab-
lishment, and data exfiltration, with each stage having a specific
set of targets. To capture the multi-stage nature of the attack, we
construct a multi-stage IFG, Gm, from the IFG G. Consider an
attack that consists of m attack stages with destinations of stage j
denoted as D j. Then we duplicate m copies of the IFG G such
that nodes in D j in the jth copy of G is connected to respective
nodes in D j in the ( j+1)th copy, for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Also, set
Dm =D. The construction of Gm guarantees that any path that
originate in set λ in the first copy and terminate in D in the mth
copy is a feasible attack path. Figure 1 shows schematic diagram
of a multi-stage IFG. For notational brevity the paper presents
the single-stage attack case, i.e., m = 1. All the algorithm and re-
sults presented in this paper also apply to the case of multi-stage
attack using Gm as the IFG.
7. Simulation
In this section we test and validate Algo-
rithms 6.1, 6.2 and HAL algorithm (Algorithm 6.3) on
two real world attack datasets. First we provide the details
on the attack datasets and explain the construction of IFGs
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corresponding to each attack from their respective system log
data. Then we discuss our experiments and present the results.
7.1. Attack Datasets
We use two attack datasets in our experiments. First attack
dataset is corresponding to a nation state attack [3] and the
second is related to a ransomware attack [17]. Each attack was
executed individually in a computer running Linux operating
system and system logs were recorded through RAIN system
[12]. System logs contain records related to both malicious and
benign information flows.
7.1.1. Nation State Attack
Nation state attack (a state-of-the-art APT attack) is a three
day adversarial engagement orchestrated by US DARPA red-
team during the evaluation of RAIN system. Attack campaign
was designed to steal sensitive proprietary and personal infor-
mation from the victim system. In our experiments we used the
system logs recorded during the day 1 of the attack. The attack
consists of four key stages: initial compromise, internal recon-
naissance, foothold establishment, and data exfiltration. Our
experiments considered the first stage of the attack, i.e., initial
compromise stage, where APT used spear-phishing to lead the
victim user to a website that was hosting ads from a malicious
web server. After navigating to the website, APT exploited a vul-
nerability in the Firefox browser and compromised the Firefox.
7.1.2. Ransomware Attack
Ransomware attack campaign was designed to block access
to the files in ./home directory and demand a payment from the
victim in exchange for regranting the access. The attack consists
of three stages: privilege escalation, lateral movement of the
attack, and encrypting and deleting ./home directory. Upon
reaching the final stage of the attack, APT first opened and read
all the files in the ./home directory of the victim computer. Then
APT wrote the content of the files in ./home into an encrypted
file named ransomware.encrypted. Finally, APT deleted the
./home directory.
7.2. Construction of IFG
Direct conversion of the system logs into IFG typically re-
sults in coarse graphs with large number of nodes and edges as
it includes all the information flows recorded during the system
execution. Majority of these information flows are related to the
system’s background processes (noise) which are unrelated to
the actual attack campaign and it is computationally intensive
to run the proposed algorithms on a state space induced by such
a coarse graph. Hence, we use the following pruning steps to
prune the coarse graph without losing any attack related causal
information flow dependencies.
1. When multiple edges with same orientation exist between
two nodes in the coarse IFG, combine them to a single
directed edge.
2. Find all the nodes in coarse IFG that have at least one
information flow path from an entry point of the attack to
a target of the attack. When attack consists of multiple
stages find all the nodes in coarse IFG that have at least
one information flow path from a destination of stage j to a
destination of a stage j+1, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}.
Figure 2: Relevant attack information of nation state attack: (a) coarse
IFG and (b) pruned IFG. Nodes of the graph are color coded to illustrate
their respective types (network socket, file, and process). A network
socket is identified as the entry points of the nation state attack. Target
of the attack is Firefox process.
Figure 3: Relevant attack information of ransomware attack: (a) coarse
IFG and (b) pruned IFG. Nodes of the graph are color coded to illustrate
their respective types (network socket, file, and process). Two network
sockets are identified as the entry points of the ransomware attack.
Targets of the attack (/usr/bin/sudo,/bin/bash,/home) are labeled in
the graph.
3. From coarse graph, extract the subgraph corresponding to
the entry points, destinations, and the set of nodes found in
Step 2.
4. Group all the nodes that corresponds to files of a single
directory to a single node related to the file directory (e.g.,
./home, ./user).
5. If the resulting graph after Steps 1-4 contains any cycles
use node versioning techniques [7] to remove cycles while
preserving the information flow dependencies in the graph.
Steps 2 and 3 are done using upstream, downstream, and point-
to-point stream pruning techniques mentioned in [12]. The re-
sulting information flow graph is called pruned IFG. We tested
the proposed algorithms on the state spaces of APT-DIFT games
corresponding to these pruned IFGs.
For the nation state attack, initial conversion of the system
logs into an IFG resulted in a coarse graph with 299 nodes and
404 edges which is presented in Figure 2(a).. We used steps 1
to 4 explained in Section 7.2 to obtain a pruned IFG with 30
nodes and 74 edges. A network socket connected to an untrusted
IP address was identified as an entry point of the attack and
the target of the attack is Firefox process. Figure 2(b) shows
the pruned IFG of nation state attack. In the IFG , there are 21
information flow paths from the entry point to the target Firefox.
For the ransomware attack, direct conversion of the system
logs resulted in a coarse IFG with 173 nodes and 482 edges
which is presented in Figure 3(a). We pruned the resulting coarse
x
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Figure 4(a) plots the value of APT-DIFT game V (k)(s0) corresponding to pruned IFG of nation state attack given in Figure 2, computed at
iterations k = 1,2, . . . ,32 in Algorithm 6.1. Figure 4(b) plots the maximum absolute error δ = maxs∈S |V (k)(s)−V (k−1)(s)|, for k = 1,2, . . . ,32.
The payoff parameter is set to β = 100.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Figure 5(a) shows the mean absolute error µ between actual value vector V and estimated value vector Vˆ (using neural network) for different
payoff parameter values β = 5,10, . . . ,100. We used 105 training data samples in the HSL algorithm (Algorithm 6.3). Figure 5(b) shows variation
in µ with respect to the number of training data samples used in HSL algorithm. In this experiment β = 50. Each data point in both cases are
calculated by averaging results over 10 independent trials. Bars in each data point shows the standard errors associated with the µ values obtained in
the different trials. Pruned IFG corresponding to the ransomware attack in Figure 3 was used in both cases.
IFG using the steps given in Section 7.2. The pruned IFG of
ransomware attack consists of 18 nodes and 29 edges. Two
network sockets that indicate series of communications with
external IP addresses in the recorded system logs were iden-
tified as the entry points of the attack. Figure 3(b) illustrates
the pruned IFG of ransomware attack with annotated targets
/usr/bin/sudo,/bin/bash,/home.
7.3. Experiments and Results
Algorithm 6.1 was implemented on APT-DIFT game model
associated with the pruned cyclic IFG of nation state attack
given in Figure 2. Figure 4(a) shows the convergence of the
value V (k)(s0) in APT-DIFT game with the iteration number k.
The threshold value of the maximum absolute error, δ , in Al-
gorithm 6.1 was set to 10−7. Note that δ = maxs∈S |V (k)(s)−
V (k−1)(s)| where k = 1,2, . . .. Figure 4(b) shows that δ mono-
tonically decreases with k. At iteration k = 32, δ = 7.79×10−8.
Algorithm 6.2 and HSL algorithm (Algorithm 6.3) were
tested on APT-DIFT game associated with the pruned acyclic
IFG of ransomware attack given in Figure 3 and results are given
in Figure 5. We used a sequential neural network with two dense
layers to learn the value vector for a given strategy pair of APT
and DIFT. Each dense layer consists of 1000 neurons and ReLU
activation function. Training data consist tuples of APT and
DIFT strategy pair and corresponding value vector of APT-DIFT
game. We generated 1×105 training data samples that consist
of randomly generated deterministic APT policies. We randomly
generated DIFT’s policies such that 40% strategies are stochastic
(mixed) and 60% are deterministic. For each randomly generated
APT and DIFT strategy pair, the corresponding value vector was
computed. A stochastic gradient descent optimizer was used
to train the neural network. In each experiment trial the neural
network was trained for 100 episodes and validation error was
set to < 1%.
In Figure 5(a) we analyze the sensitivity of estimated value
vector to the variations of payoff parameter, β by plotting the
mean absolute error µ between actual value vector V and es-
timated value vector Vˆ , i.e., µ = ∑s∈S |V (s)− Vˆ (s)|/|S|, with
respect to β . In these experiments 105 training data samples
were used in HSL algorithm. The results show that Vˆ values
are close and consistent with V values when β parameter takes
smaller values and variations between Vˆ and V is increased when
β takes larger values. A reason for this behavior can be the nu-
merical unstability associated with the training and estimating
xi
tasks done in the neural network model used in HSL algorithm.
In order to study the effect of the length of training data samples
on the estimated value vector we plot µ against number of train-
ing data samples used in HSL algorithm in Figure 5(b). β = 50
was used in the experiments. The results show that µ decreases
with the number of training data samples used in HSL algorithm
as the increased number of training data samples improves the
learning in neural network model.
8. Conclusion
This paper studied detection of Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs) using a Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT)-
based detection mechanism. We modeled the strategic interac-
tion between the APT and DIFT as a non-cooperative stochastic
game with total reward structure. The APT-DIFT game has im-
perfect information as both APT and DIFT are unaware of the
actions of the opponent. Also, our game model incorporates
the false-positives and false-negatives generated by DIFT. We
considered two scenarios of the game (i) when the transition
probabilities, i.e., rates of false-positives and false-negatives, are
known to both players and (ii) when the transition probabilities
are unknown to both players. For case (i), we proposed a value
iteration-based algorithm and proved convergence and complex-
ity. For case (ii), we proposed Hierarchical Supervised Learning
(HSL), a supervised learning-based algorithm that utilizes the
hierarchical structure of the state space of the APT-DIFT game,
that integrates a neural network with a policy iteration algorithm
to compute an approximate equilibrium of the game. We imple-
mented our algorithms on real attack datasets for nation state and
ransomware attacks collected using the RAIN framework and
validated our results and performance.
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